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Analysis and synthesis are clearly the methodological key concepts that can provide us with a better understanding of both Descartes' and Spinoza's opera magna, and 
they can do this in a number of ways according to the manifold meaning of this pair of 
concepts in Descartes' oeuvre. In my paper I would like to focus on but one aspect of 
Descartes' understanding of these concepts in order to propose an interpretation of 
Spinoza's answer to the main methodological question of cartesianism. A recent inter-
pretator puts the question as follows: 
„But there must be something more to 'geometrical order' than simply 'the structure 
of presentation of Euclid's Elements'. After all, as Descartes in effect noted in his reply to 
Mersenne, there is no necessity even for geometry to be laid out in this way. So there must 
be some further rationale behind this surface form. [...] It is not clear why Spinoza chose 
this synthetic method of presentation for the Ethics;"1 
What I shall try to do, is to find at least „some further rationale behind this surface 
form". As all we know, the most important treatment of the topic by Descartes can be 
found in the Second Replies. Here he argues that the best way of teaching metaphysics is 
the analysis, in contrast to the synthesis that does not seem to be apt for this task at all. 
Descartes refers to the Meditations as the work which was written in the analytic style, and 
I think it is not only the central, metaphysical part of the Discours that follows the same 
order but the whole work as well.2 As to the Principia it is a disputed question whether we 
can take Burman's well-known statement seriously that the intended character of this 
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work is synthetic. But we do not need to settle this question here. What I would like to 
offer you is, first, a very short analysis of only one aspect of how this basic decision pre-
forms the general structure of the Meditations. 
The title „Meditationes" expresses the rationale of this decision in referring to a then 
well-known literary genre that aimed at transforming the whole man, converting her from 
the outer world to the inner, and, at the same time, 'upper' sphere of being. Nevertheless, 
this analogy must not be pushed too far. Descartes did not want to imitate the structure 
of any of the particular works pertaining to this genre. He just wanted to stress the sig-
nificance of grasping the whole man as opposed to the theoretical 'part' of it on the one 
hand, and, on the other hand, of the process whereby the reader is being initiated gradu-
ally instead of being overrun by ideas and theses alien to her. 
The role of extending and intensifying the methodical doubt can be best understood 
as an aid for distracting the reader's mind from the outer material world of the senses. 
The introduction of the genius malignus represents the last step of the overall analysis — in 
the sense of 'destruction' — of the everyday beliefs, an analysis which is of greatest exis-
tential import.3 Since it is not on the basis of scientific arguments that we trust in sense-
experience as the only and highly reliable source of our knowledge of the world but we 
have been brought up in this belief, it would clearly be in vain to attempt to abolish this 
firm belief with the aid of some argument however cogent logically it might be. There are 
several statements both in Descartes and in the early Spinoza that indicate this very cir-
cumstance. 
"But it is not enough merely to have noticed this; I must make an effort to remember 
it. My habitual opinions keep coming back, and, despite my wishes, they capture my 
belief, which is as it were bound over to them as a result of long occupation and the law 
of custom."4 
"But not without reason did I use these words if only I could resolve in earnest. For 
though I perceived these things se clearly in my mind, I still could not, on that account, 
put aside all greed, desire for sensual pleasure and love of esteem."5 
What is needed is rather a curious mixture of philosophical and rethorical devices, the 
later having the following sense. The author must take considerable efforts to develope a 
layer of presuppositions concerning the structure of the world that is familiar both to him-
self and the reader. This is needed because the reader is supposed to attain the new 
insights as if it was he who had found them. If Descartes uses the expression a priori in 
this context, it has none of the usual meanings but rather something like this. Our point 
of departure must be that part of our knowledge of the world which seems to be trivially 
known — before all conscious efforts to understand things. There is a number of ways this 
task can be accomplished. The Discourse, the Meditations, and Spinoza's early Treatise on the 
Improvement of the Understanding all make use of different technics. Whichever method one 
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might make use of, the reader has to contribute to the process, as well, in order that the 
therapy succeeds. A certain openness to eventually new principles of structuring the world 
for us seems to be inevitable. All these considerations play a role in the special Cartesian 
sense of analysis. 
However we may understand the methodological character of the first part of the 
Principles, the Rationes which are put at the end of the Responsiones Secundae are surely 
structured according to the geometrical order demanded by Mersenne and his circle, and 
it was this presentation which provided the basis for Spinoza's re-casting the Cartesian 
principles in his Principia philosophiae cartesianae. But what forced him to abandon his fore-
runner's argumentation against the use of the synthetic, i. e. geometrical method in teach-
ing metaphysics, at the moment he had to chose the way of presentation for his magnum 
opus, the Ethics? I shall argue that a gloomy picture of man's abilities and unabilities was 
the decisive factor that made Spinoza believe that no artificial i.e. therapeutical means are 
ever able to influence one's whole being if one is not already disposed somehow to think 
in this or that way. He was reluctant to sacrifice the persuasive force of a seemingly uni-
tary deductive system for the sake of the unity of an analytical-inductive (in Descartes' 
sense) system built on the opposite presuppositions. 
The Treatise can clearly be regarded yet as an analytical writing, although Spinoza did 
not make use of all the Cartesian devices: he accords the cogito-argument only a secondary 
role. But both the beginning and the end of the main line of thought as well as the medi-
ation between the two are indisputably borrowings from the Cartesian analysis. The point 
of departure is our given, true ideas of finite things, the goal is the adequate knowledge 
of the infinite being, while the investigation and notably the definition of human under-
standing is expected to lead us from its own true ideas to its own condition of possibility. 
„Next, because Method is reflexive knowledge itself, this foundation, which must 
direct our thoughts, can be nothing other than knowledge of what constitutes the form 
of truth, and knowledge of the intellect, and its properties and powers. For once we have 
acquired this [knowledge], we shall have the foundation from which we shall deduce our 
thoughts and the way by which the intellect, according to its capacity, will be able to reach 
the knowledge of eternal things, with due regard, of course, to its own powers."6 
Now, according to the Treatise, the crucial point of the argument is the definition of 
understanding. We are given a theory of definition, but this theory can only be applied 
to evaluating given definitions, while the question remains unanswered, how to find cor-
rect definitions. There seems to emerge two possible solutions: the definition of the thing 
investigated is either clear in itself, or it becomes clear after we enumerated its main pro-
prieties. In the end of the Treatise Spinoza enumerates a couple of the proprieties of the 
intellect but we are not given the definition resulting of this process, and 1 suppose this is 
the main reason why the Treatise breaks down at this point. At the same time, however, it 
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becomes evident gradually that there is one being, the definition of which can at least be 
made clear in itself, and this being is „the source and origin of Nature", „a unique and infi-
nite being, beyond which there is no being", i. e. God. For however it may be true that 
the analytical movement of the Treatise can principally begin with any given, true idea, the 
best method, we are told, can only be attained if it is based on the given idea of the most 
perfect being. 
„[...] the reflexive knowledge of the idea of the most perfect being will be more excel-
lent than the reflexive knowledge of any other ideas. That is, the most perfect Method will 
be the one that shows how the mind is to be directed according to the standard of the 
given idea of the most perfect Being."7 
But if the idea of the most perfect being is, in a sense, given, too, and if our aim is that 
all our ideas be united and referred to a basic idea „so that our mind, as far as possible, 
reproduces objectively the formal character of nature, both as to the whole and as to the 
parts."8 then why not attempt to follow the direct way from the basic idea of God that 
becomes immediately clear in the definition of the „uncreated" being, instead of making 
a long detour through the given idea of a finite being. Or, put in another way, if we are 
confronted with the fact that the given idea of the „uncreated being" is much more acces-
sible to us than Descartes has thought it when stressing the necessity of the analytical ratio 
demonstrandi, then nothing can prevent us from employing that „ordo philosophandi" accord-
ing to which it is the consideration of the divine nature that we need first of all, „because 
it is prior both in knowledge and in nature".9 
Having followed up this line of thought we can direct our attention now to the pecu-
liar way L. Meyer whom Spinoza asked for explaining that his Cartesian philosophy dif-
fers considerably from that of Descartes' tries to make understandable why he has chosen 
the synthetic way of demonstration for his reconstruction of Descartes' Principles. The 
author of the Preface had to show that Spinoza's treatment absolutely agrees with the spir-
it of Cartesianism even if it may be at odds with the letter of Descartes'. Meyer cites 
Descartes' views concerning analysis and synthesis admitting his preference for analysis. 
But he seems to assume his position is better than Descartes' as to judging whether the 
cartesian idea of analysis achieved the aim desired by Descartes or it led to consequences 
contrary to his philosophical goal. Descartes' assumption must have been this: the thera-
peutic analysis manages to persuade of the truth of the new philosophy even those peo-
ple who would be appauled by the dry, synthetic treatment. According to Meyer, howev-
er, people are radically different with regard to their openness to new principles of know-
ing things in the broadest sense of the word. The one is willing to consider them seriously, 
no matter whether they are demonstrated synthetically or analytically, while the other is 
able only to parrot-like repetition even after following the analytical way, which is, of 
course, diametrically opposed to Descartes' intentions. 
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„That is why many who have been led, either by a blind impulse, or by the authority 
of someone else, to enlist as followers of Descartes, have only impressed his opinions and 
doctrines on their memory; when the subject comes up, they know only how to chatter 
and babble, but not how to demonstrate anything, as was, and still is, the custom among 
those who are attached to Aristotle's philosophy."10 
Consequently, we can see here two excellent reasons emerging for Spinoza why betray 
the therapeutic analysis as overall methodic ideal.11 He was, first of all, entitled to draw 
our attention to the fact that the firm contention Descartes himself insisted on was that 
the basic ideas of the ethico-metaphysical system are somehow in the minds of the par-
ticular human beings who, for this very reason, must be led to the consideration of these 
ideas in such manner that it appeared to them as if they found these ideas themselves. 
Secondly, he could, with L. Meyer, refer to the experience that those people whom 
Descartes tried to persuade in this way to follow him attained only to the consideration 
of Descartes' letter instead of leaning on the inborn ideas of their own minds. And those 
who really appropriated Cartesian thinking, they would have been willing to approve it 
even if it was treated synthetically. That is, it does not seem to be worth while attempting 
to create therapeutic devices. One has simply to divide people in two groups. Those 
searching the truth seriously, par la lumière naturelle, can be given Cartesian, synthetic writ-
ings without further ado while everybody else will remain dominated by rules either of 
reason or the imagination of others stylized as commandments of either some clever 
imposteurs regarded as theocratic rulers or of some .rare pious men, whose transcendent 
origin can, of course, hardly be argued for within the confines of Spinoza's system. 
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